IF metaphors were truth : : not if playing with fire

 (If Derrida is dismissing literature.) Literature for philosophy he is dead wrong. If literature can not act in place of philosophy. (Point blank.) If this is his purpose for negating philosophy. Again, he is wrong on both counts. It seems as though he is looking for a counter argument to uphold his argument. That literature transposes philosophy, therefore philosophy is something irrelevant if used as a way to make that point. (My point being, using the word 'transposes') that if Derrida is somehow tangibly making literature something that can not be inferred from. Then, this question of what is literature becomes a kind of transfer between ideas that is blurred between transmitting information from reader to its author or vis versa.

In conclusion: my argument against Derrida is that literature is a vehicle for the purpose of philosophy. Not just a literary device. The device of which literature would not be invented as though language would not permit it, nor could we devise. We use language (philosophy as in language) in order to make these assumptions of the world based on literary comprehension. The very basis of comprehension into what is literature would be only located by our sensory input. (Derrida is arguing the opposite.) = That if literature were truth, we would not be able to find the language to interpret it. My point = Such is an exercise in performing what is philosophical to the trained mind for literature. (i.e. Truth as in literature)

P.S. I welcome any rejection of my argument against Derrida. Remember, all Derrida is suggesting is that there is no truth to be found in literature. That's my idea. The argument: is proof of what is not Derrida's thesis but is deferred in my argument.

- Marco

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“To take some examples: why should ‘literature’ still designate that which already breaks away from literature—away from what has always been conceived and signified under that name—or that which, not merely escaping literature, implacably destroys it? (Posed in these terms, the question would already be caught in the assurance of a certain fore-knowledge: can ‘what has always been conceived and signified under that name’ be considered fundamentally homogeneous, univocal, or nonconflictual?) To take other examples: what historical and strategic function should henceforth be assigned to the quotation marks, whether visible or invisible, which transform this into a ‘book,’ or which still make the deconstruction of philosophy into a ‘philosophical discourse’?”

–Jacques Derrida