“The life of God and divine cognition may thus be spoken of as a disporting of love with itself; but this idea sinks into edification, and even into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative. In itself that life is indeed untroubled equality and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the overcoming of this alienation, are not serious matters. But this in-itself is abstract universality, in which its nature, to be for itself, and therefore the self-movement of form, are left out of account. When the form is declared to be equal to the essence, it is therefore a misunderstanding to suppose that cognition can be content with the in-itself or essence, and dispense with the form—that the absolute principle or absolute intuition makes the development of the former or the exposition of the latter superfluous. Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed merely as essence, that is, as immediate substance or as pure self-intuition of the divine, but equally as form, and in the whole wealth of the developed form.”
— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807
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If "in-itselfness" as Hegel puts it: is a condition for the esoteric mind (any philosopher), what this then illustrates is a lack of comprehension to the divine. = What Hegel is saying.
My point being - divinity of a philosopher's in-itselfness - happens if they claim divinity in words, through which our agreements are limited to the philosopher's "in-itselfness".
The negation for a philosopher's in-itselfness enhances meaning, because what is the philosopher's words are tested by means of interpretation. So if there is nothing to test or treat what is divine, how would we know what acts divine survives in time.
- Marco
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