The Logic of Illusion
Contradiction is a category error
T: Phenomena is proved by measurement
A: Measurement is unprovable
S: Antinomie
Consider the following:
How can male be the opposite of female if all life is related to itself, and has evolved from itself, was itself, and is now entirely itself?
Two dialectically opposed judgments may both be false; for one is not mere contradictory of the other, but may say something more than is required for a simple category of contradiction.
Dialectical opposition is not simply proposing P, the thesis, and not P, the antithesis. Nor is there the suggestion that the Law of Excluded Middle does not hold; that something can be both P and not P.
The ontological distinction between phenomena and noumena, is the epistemological classes of objects that are clearly heterogeneous.
If an attempt is made to combine the two in harmony — to draw a synthesis — the combination can only be attained by accepting the initial heterogeneity.
If the distinction is accepted, a synthesis must be denied.
Understanding is rooted in the phenomenal world of empirical senses
Only unity to be achieved — a resolution between thesis and antithesis — will be a synthesis of appearances.
This is not a successful unity, however, but an illusion.
Appearances always fall into contradictions and the antinomy remains.
Reason, as a transcendental principle, is ‘…an idea which can never be reconciled with appearances.’
Knowledge of things (appearances) is distinct from our knowledge of things in themselves.
The place of ‘contradiction’ in Kant’s dialectic is quite consistent with the rules of traditional logic.
Although reason demands things in themselves as ‘unconditioned’, such knowledge, Kant believed, ‘cannot be thought without contradiction’ of the empirical notion of things for us.
These are conditioned and within the appearance of a causal framework. But as soon as we recognise these different forms of knowledge are heterogeneous, ‘the contradiction vanishes’.
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My rebuttal:
Not sure why measurement is unprovable though. If I move from a to b I can postulate b is better choice to make than a.
Marco Almeida ©️ 2025
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Marco Almeida - Axioms are unprovable truths. Such axioms predicate mathematical measurements. Gödel's incompleteness theorems, published by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are two profound results in mathematical logic that reveal inherent limitations in formal axiomatic systems. The first theorem states that in any sufficiently strong, consistent formal system (one that can describe basic arithmetic), there will always be true statements about numbers that cannot be proven within the system itself. The second theorem extends this, demonstrating that such a system cannot prove its own consistency.
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Marco Almeida You don't agree with godel's incompleteness theorem?
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My rebuttal:
Kirk Lazenby it's that there's a chance that not all truths are absolutes. Which is what I think we are disagreeing on. Our disagreement is ambiguous at best. Godël proved nothing can be absolute. What I disagree with is that reason itself, can fluctuate between variables. Therefore, using contingency analysis we can only guess with what is true or not (without any absolute truth notwithstanding.) For example: if I want to shoot someone in the head. The behavior in itself we would agree makes me culpable. But if I want to shoot but do not. This does not disqualify I made a choice based on no true or flase fallacy of it. I chose not to shoot. It does not make the action I took not to any less false. I may still have wanted to shoot - but didn't. The act of not shooting, is an action that to reason or not to reason makes me morally complicit in activating movement of that reason to carry out my decision. However, if I were pathological, I may jusitfy my actions as just.
Marco Almeida ©️ 2025
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